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ABSTRACT: This paper outlines the debate over the artificiality of 
national identities by attempting to explore questions such as: What 
are national identities? How are they created? And, who is involved 
in creating them? If they are modern creations then why do their 
adherents insist they are ancient? If they are created what are the 
goals of their creators. This debate is increasingly relevant in the 
context of migration and integration; a phenomenon that primarily 
seems to affect the Global North. 
KEY WORDS: custom, ethnicity, identity, nationalism, traditionThe central image used in defining globalization was oriented toward a descriptive model which pointed to “a process, a 
condition, a system, a force and an age,”1 that affected not only the 
social, economic, political, cultural and environmental conditions of 
humanity, but also national identities. Triggered by conflict as well 
as by economic hardship, the current transnational migration will 
most likely resurrect the lingering debates over identity, particularly 
as numerous migrants become resistant to being integrated into the host nation. 
Artificiality of National Identities: The Debate
The need for a debate over the artificiality of national identities was 
apparently enunciated in 1969 by Fredrik Barth, in his introduction 
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to a multi-authored collection of essays titled, Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Yet, the real 
debate erupted only after the publication of Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, by Benedict 
Anderson, in 1983. 
At his time, Fredrik Barth did not see nationalism as an artificially 
created identity, but as a persistent cultural trait which can’t be 
subjected to development. To his credit, he was able to challenge 
the common tendency expressed by the sociologists who associated 
nationalism with modernization, and saw it as a trait of the political 
culture, and not as something embedded into the cultural psyche. 
In his call to challenge this status quo, Fredrik Barth stated 
that, “the constitution of ethnic groups, and the nature of boundaries 
between them, has not been correspondingly investigated.”2 On this 
same occasion he emphasized that while boundaries between ethnic 
groups can disappear, identities do not. His argument was based on 
three approaches such as: 
1) the contention that ethnic groups are categories of ascription 
and identification by the actors themselves; 
2) the existence of a clear process in generating and maintaining 
ethnic groups; and 
3) the focus on ethnic boundaries and boundary maintenance.3 
Nevertheless, the debate over the artificiality of national identities 
gained serious impetus with Benedict Anderson’s provocative book Imagined Communities, published in 1983. Unlike, with the 
contemporary waves of cultural primordialism advocated by political 
scientists such as Samuel Huntington (who considers identity as 
a given),4 Benedict Anderson is a constructivist par excellance, 
considering identity as a learned, mutable concept. In defining the 
artificiality of national identity, Anderson contends that this is 
imagined because the members of even the smallest nation 
will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, 
or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image 
of their communion.5 
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Because of this imagined community, people create imaginary 
bounds of commonalities with other people, whom they neither met 
nor will they ever, but treat them, in their minds, as extended family. 
During the past three decades, numerous scholars such as 
Walker Connor, Loring Danforth, Michael Hechter, Donald Howowitz, 
David Laitin, Amílcar Antonio Barreto, Mila Dragojević, and others 
have produced seminal works on various aspects of nationalism that 
either expanded Anderson’s typology or looked into adjacent issues. 
This demonstrates that Anderson’s ideas are still widely accepted in 
defining nationalism as an imagined political community, sovereign 
and inherently limited, which took shape with the deconstruction 
of the belief in a divinely-ordained ruing class. Furthermore, it is 
widely accepted that nationalism took shape in the post-Westphalian 
context, which created a shift of focus of sacredness from a universal 
(often religious) language (e.g. Latin), to an indigenous language 
spoken and understood by all. This development was ignited by 
the idea of simultaneity generated by the development of the 
18th century’s print media (novel and newspaper), which created 
virtual bonds amongst people. Thus, the script language infused 
the concept of sacredness to a national language, while the idea of 
a centripetal center of authority infused the ideas of sovereignty 
and self-determination. 
The development of the print-languages had several 
consequences, as it created new unified fields of communication, gave 
fixity to a language through the creation of grammar and dictionary, 
and infused a nation’s historicity. Certain dialects dominated the 
fixity of language, endorsing a sense of group superiority that stays 
at the basis of nation-state. 
Benedict Anderson’s work offered new paradigms which have 
clarified numerous ambiguities of self-identification. Moreover, 
Anderson offered new tools that became the basic guidelines in the 
development of surveys related to people’s self-identifications and 
self-attachment to imagined communities. 
As the debate over the artificiality of national identities 
erupted, a new volume of essays edited by Eric Hobsbawm and 
Terence Ranger was published under the title The Invention of 
Tradition, challenging the claim of tradition’s “ancientness” as a 
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marker of identity. As expected, this new volume fueled the debate 
over the artificiality of national identities, as it challenged the claim 
of ancientness of certain British customs used as instruments in 
reclaiming the royalty’s vanishing glory. The strongest debate 
surrounded the issue of custom versus tradition. A custom was 
defined as a local habit emergent from resource availability and with 
no real historical backing, whereas tradition was defined as a cultural 
continuity of beliefs, principles and social attitudes, of unknown 
precise historical origins. This controversy erupted over an inferred 
British claim of uncontestable historicity of certain customs, when, 
in fact, these were invented no earlier than the nineteenth century. 
This included the use of the quilt, the creation of new Indian princes, 
and the use of the parades. 
A Scottish invention, the quilt became representative of the 
British army then soon turned into a symbol of loyalty. As one 
would argue, this is but one example of a “law of unanticipated 
consequences,” whereby a Scottish folkloric tradition is transplanted 
and turned into a symbol of loyalty. 
In distinguishing between tradition and custom, Hobsbawm writes that tradition 
must be distinguished clearly from ‘custom’ which dominates 
so-called ‘traditional’ societies. The object and characteristic 
of ‘traditions,’ including invented ones, is invariance. The 
past, real or invented, to which they refer, imposes fixed 
(normally formalized) practices, such as repetition. ‘Custom’ 
in traditional societies has the double function of motor 
and fly-wheel. It does not preclude innovation and change 
up to a point, though evidently the requirement that it must 
appear compatible or even identical with precedent imposes substantial limitations on it.6 
While Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger challenged the 19th 
century British construction of symbolic and ceremonial traditions, 
Patrick Geary, in his book The myth of Nations, attempted to 
deconstruct the nationalist myths of the European nations. He added 
to the debate the existence of three stages in the creation of imagined 
communities in Central and Eastern Europe such as: 
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1) the study of language, culture and history; 
2) interpretation and promotion of ‘national’ writings by 
patriots; and 
3) the apogee, whereby a national movement reaches its peak.7 
These aspects have, in fact, been the key basis the nationalist 
doctrine and of national identity. 
National Identity: Its Creation, Its Actors and Their Goal
The concept of nation (and national identity) was based on the myth 
of a common descent and on the idea of a shared identity linking the 
elite and the masses. Historically, the promoters of the concepts of 
nation and nationalism were the members of the middle class elites, 
such as intelligentsia, merchants, landlords, and various types of 
professionals including lawyers, military men, local and provincial 
functionaries.8 
The intellectuals were professionals with access both to the 
ruling class and to the peasants. This status quo had enabled the 
intellectuals to comprehend both classes well enough to be able 
to communicate and generate new ideologies about identity. As 
the intellectuals claimed to be the legitimate representatives of 
the peasants—or “the dominant group’s deputies” in Gramsci’s words9—the intellectuals placed their efforts in the creation of 
a hegemonic belief which was to become dominant. Once a new 
ideology was transformed into a societal consciousness of identity, 
and thus turned hegemonic, this new ideology became a dominant 
concept of identity, which was in a permanent need of being restated, 
reassured, and defended by the intellectuals against any possible 
detractors; thus securing their control over political power. 
Viewed differently, the members of the middle class were the 
only ones who had enough confidence to challenge the legitimacy 
of the ruling class, and also able to understand and maintain ties 
with the lower class. Therefore, in order to usurp the authority of 
the ruling class, the intellectuals invented artificial bounds so as to 
create a sense of community that would easily respond to certain 
Simion: Are National Identities Artificial? 205
incentives and unite against an oppressive ruling class. Another 
element that is defended by the elite was their strategic association 
with traditional values and with pre-existing folk beliefs that were 
already hegemonic. This was rather a utilitarian strategic use by the 
intelligentsia, yet endowed with great outcome. 
As Benedict Anderson explains, in Central and South America, 
nationalism was ignited not by the Indians, but by the Europeans 
immigrants who wanted to break away from Europe. More to the 
point, in the case of 19th century Puerto Rico, as Amílcar Barreto 
explains, the “criollo elites began constructing a new identity that 
glorified local customs and accentuated the jíbaro—the island’s 
mountain peasant—as the paradigmatic Puerto Rican.”10 Once being 
the lower class of European society, the new immigrants seeking a 
better life in America, soon became empowered by what the New 
World had to offer, turning themselves into a strong middle class 
elite, and manifesting strong tendencies of self-sufficiency. 
As Hobsbawm and Ranger explain, the creators of British 
nationalism were the London inhabitants of Welsh origins who, once 
financially accomplished in the new place, turned nostalgic about 
their origins. Nevertheless, the intelligentsia made use of tradition 
not only as nostalgia but also as a self-defense mechanism directed 
against modernity. Consequently, the local legends, symbols and 
songs, bearing the slightest community–related theme, were often 
redefined and retransmitted, this time with a heavy impetus of a 
glorious past. As in the British case, the dragon became the symbol 
of Whales, while the song writers expressed real opposition to 
modernity, often invoking Druidic elements. 
Moreover, the British cooptation and even “invention” of new 
Indian princes, was used as a symbolic act to create new ties between 
India and the British Empire. Towards this goal, the British invented 
new ceremonies that were neither Indian nor British, yet crafted for 
the purpose of creating a new national identity. 
As Hobsbawm himself surveys the development of mass 
traditions in Europe up to the First World War, he finds that the 
strongest symbolic elements in creating national identities are 
festivals, holidays, monuments, stamps, sports and schools associated 
with nationalism, the labor movement, and the rising middle classes. 
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Additionally, as Anderson points out, national identity is created also 
through symbols that the members of a community could identify 
with, such as the symbol of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, meant 
to respect the heroism of an imagined community. 
As the first national identity was credited to the French 
revolution, this was promoted and advanced through the Napoleon’s 
Wars. Quoting from Etienne Bonnot de Condillac—who is credited 
for having argued that ‘each language expresses the character of 
the people who speak it’—Patrick Geary makes strong efforts to 
demonstrate that the objectification of language was the backbone 
of creating national identity; thus acknowledging the strong 
contribution made by the German linguists.11 Furthermore, Geary 
holds the ethno-archaeology accountable for creating a false sense 
of historicity. 
In the case of the 1995 debate over the 50 anniversary of WWII, 
which raised the question of displaying the fuselage of the Enola 
Gay—the airplane which dropped the atomic bomb in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki—heated debates surrounded the issue of American 
national identity. This unfortunate debate, which emerged into 
a political rage detonated at that time by the ultraconservative 
House Speaker, Newt Gingrich, demonstrated that the invention of 
the American nation is still an open-ended experiment.12 This is so 
because—as Amílcar Barreto explains—in the US the “dominant 
social groups have emphasized some cultural traits over others.”13 
Another goal of the nationalists is the creation of cultural 
boundaries as a way of safeguarding identity, as well as an ideological 
sense of protecting one’s kin. These boundaries are acclaimed to be 
both physical and ideological. As language is an obvious factor of 
identity, this has often fueled claims for boundaries, as in the case 
of the Quebecoise nationalist ideology.14 
Modernity and Why History
Nationalism is a modern phenomenon that uses history more as an 
ideological tool, and less as a narrative of past events. Nationalists 
often link their identity to a glorious legendary past, which in 
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numerous instances, this either did not exist, or if it did so, it existed 
for a short period of time. Because of this ideology, nationalists 
often dream of the “greater” country. Often, nationalist elites claim 
symbolic identities, which their ancestors never had, as in the 
case of the European elite in Mexico using Aztec symbols. Yet, it is 
important to specify that these Aztec symbols were romanticized 
and appropriated only after the real threat of the Aztecs has been 
completely eliminated. 
As Eric Hobsbawm writes, 
[m]ore interesting, from our point of view, is the use of 
ancient materials to construct invented traditions of a novel 
type for quite novel purposes. A large store of such materials 
is accumulated in the past of any society, and an elaborate 
language of symbolic practice and communication is always 
available. Sometimes new traditions could be readily grafted 
on old ones, sometimes they could be devised by borrowing 
from the well-supplied warehouse of official ritual, symbolism 
and moral exhortation - religion and princely pomp, folklore 
and freemasonry (itself an earlier invented tradition of great 
symbolic force).15 
Derivative of ancient myths, Patrick Geary tries to demonstrate that 
modern nations which link their past to ancient myths are purely 
wrong, since the elites borrow ancient myths to gain popularity and 
political support to advance their political interests. In other words, 
the elites act mainly as primordialists by appropriating existing narratives. 
As the debate over the artificiality of national identities went 
beyond Anderson’s theoretical backdrop, new case studies made 
serious attempts to demonstrate this theory. 
One tendency was not just to deconstruct, but rather to question 
the so called claims for “ancientness” of customs and traditions 
that were once considered taboos. This is a case not only raised by 
Hobsbawm and Ranger in The Invention of Tradition, but also a case 
strongly argued by Patrick Geary’s recent book The myth of Nations. 
The authors of the essays contend that many so called “traditional” 
practices—particularly those related to public ceremonial—are 
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in fact quite recent inventions, often deliberately constructed to 
instrumentalize particular ideologies. As Eric Hobsbawm writes in 
the introduction of the volume, “[n]othing appears more ancient and 
linked to an immemorial past, than the pageantry which surrounds 
British monarchy in its public ceremonial manifestations.”16 
In conclusion a nation is an imagined political community, 
created by the elites through a unified language and myths of 
common ancestry; both used for objective and utilitarian reasons so 
as to foster a shift of power from the ruling class to the intelligentsia. 
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